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Comments
COUNSEL FEES IN MATRIMONIAL ACTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of allowing counsel fees to the wife in matri-
monial actions stemmed initially from the common law position
of the husband as controller of all the property and finances of
the marriage. Wives ordinarily had no independent resources
and lacked the money both to secure counsel to institute divorce
or separation proceedings and to defend against matrimonial ac-
tions brought against them by their husbands.' The courts early
attempted to equalize husband and wife by requiring the hus-
band to pay his wife's counsel fees. Currently authority to award
counsel fees to the wife is in some jurisdictions judicially assumed
as an "incident" of the divorce court's "general jurisdiction"
while others provide for it specifically by statute.2  Whatever
the source of judicial power may be, broad judicial discretion
over counsel fees in matrimonial actions is everywhere the rule.3
Presently the traditional practice of awarding counsel fees
to the wife is under attack, the most famous perhaps consisting
in the report of the 1956 Royal Commission on Marriage and
Divorce.4 The legal and social status of wives, it is claimed, has
materially been improved and they are today in a position to
pay their own lawyers. The reason for the traditional practice
or much of it has ceased to exist and so therefore should the
practice.5 In general, however, such arguments have carried little
1 Morland, Keezer on the Law of Marriage and Divorce §§ 601, 610
(3rd ed. 1946).
2 O'Dea v. O'Dea, 31 Hun. (N.Y.) 441 (1884); Kiel v. Kiel, 146 Misc.
333, 261 N.Y.S. 162 (1932); Hunt v. Hunt, 23 Okla. 490, 100 Pac. 541
(1909). And see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-315 (1956); Colo. Rev.
Stat. 46-1-5 (1953); Rev. Stat. of Maine c. 166 § 59 (1954).
3 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-308 (Reissue 1952); Code of Laws of So. Carolina
§ 20-112, (1952); Jeffords v. Jeffords, 216 S.C. 451, 58 S.E.2d 731
(1950); Klekamp v. Klekarnp, 275 Ill. 98, 113 N.E. 852 (1916); 4 A.L.R.
926; 143 A.L.R. 799; 56 A.L.R.2d 120.
4 Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, Report 1951-1955, cmd.
9678 (1956).
5 Ibid.
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weight with the courts. Wives are still generally entitled to
counsel fees in matrimonial actions.6
There are, however, various distinctions and exceptions and
it is the purpose here to review them critically. Counsel fee
problems common to all matrimonial actions are first discussed
followed by a consideration of problems peculiar to particular
kinds of matrimonial actions. A final section reviews the wisdom
of traditional practice in the light of contemporary social condi-
tions.
II. IN GENERAL
The first general problem concerns the drafting of the mo-
tion or application for counsel fees. Although a few statutes
provide that the allowance be made directly to the attorney or
made either to the wife or her attorney,7 the general rule is that
the motion or application must be in the name of the wife and
the order made to her and not to her attorney.8 While Nebraska
statutes do not specifically describe to whom payment shall be
made, the usual procedure in Nebraska follows the general rule
in allowing attorney's fees to the wife for her attorney.9 Cham-
bers v. Chambers raised the question of the trial court's right to
grant the attorney's fees directly to the attorney and held that
it was formal error only and would not afford just ground for
complaint.10
6 Tanner v. Tanner, 229 La. 399, 86 So.2d 80 (1956); Eals v. Swan,
221 La. 329, 59 So.2d 409 (1952); Zatavern v. Zatavern, 155 Neb. 395,
52 N.W.2d 254 (1952).
7 Ind. Stat. Ann. 1933 § 3-1216 (Reissue 1946); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
518.14 (1957 Supp.). The Minnesota statutes provide also that an
award of attorney's fees made by the court during the pendency
of the action or in the final judgment survives the action and if
not paid by the party directed to pay the same may be enforced
as above provided or by a separate civil action brought by the at-
torney in his own name. If the action is dismissed or abandoned
prior to determination and award of the attorney's fees the court
may nevertheless award attorney's fees upon the attorney's motion
and such award also survives the action and may be enforced in
the same manner as last above provided. Also Rev. Stat. of Maine
c. 166 §§ 59, 64 (1954); Ann. Laws of Mass. c. 208 § 38 (1955).
8 Parker v. Parker, 71 Miss. 164, 14 So. 459 (1893); 118 A.L.R. 1134.
9 Willits v. Willits, 76 Neb. 228, 107 N.W. 379 (1906); Zatavern v. Za-
tavern, 155 Neb. 395, 52 N.W.2d 254 (1952); Bowman v. Bowman,
163 Neb. 336, 79 N.W.2d 554 (1956); Zych v. Zych, 165 Neb. 586,
86 N.W.2d 611 (1957).
10 Chambers v. Chambers, 75 Neb. 850, 106 N.W. 993 (1906).
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Another problem is the time in which the fees will be al-
lowed. Counsel fees may be allowed at any time and from time
to time while the action is pending." It is usual to allow them
at the beginning of the action, upon the appearance of the de-
fendant or on the return day of the summons.12  In Nebraska,
the court may order them at any stage of the action until the
rendition of the final decree and provisions for the same may
even be and often are included in the final decree. 13 In other
jurisdictions, however, counsel fees incurred during the trial can-
not be awarded in the final judgment unless the right to do so
has previously been reserved.14
A third question concerns the amount of the allowance. The
wife must ask that the allowance be made to her to prosecute
or defend the action and it is wholly immaterial in some states
whether or not she has independent means. 15 A number of re-
cent cases, however, have held that counsel fees will not be
allowed to a wife who has ample means of her own.'0 But in
all states the predominant theme of the case law is the sound
discretion of the trial court, and it is only when such discretion
is abused that an appellate court will disturb the allowance.' 7
The judge may determine from his own experience, having in
mind the character of the services to be performed, the ability
11 Moreland, Keezer on the Law of Marriage and Divorce § 612 (3rd
ed. 1946); Rose v. Rose, 109 Cal. 544, 42 Pac. 452 (1895).
12 Bauman v. Bauman, 18 Ark. 32(6, 68 Am. Dec. 171 (1857).
13 Kiddle v. Kiddle, 90 Neb. 248, 133 N.W. 181 (1911); Willits v. Wilits,
76 Neb. 228, 107 N.W. 379 (1906).
14 Morland, Keezer on the Law of Marriage and Divorce § 612 (3rd
ed. 1946); Lacey v. Lacey, 108 Cal. 45, 40 Pac. 1056 (1895); Newman
v. Newman, 69 Ill. 167 (1873); Wagner v. Wagner, 34 Minn. 441, 26
N.W. 450 (1886); Baler v. Baier, 91 Minn. 165, 97 N.W. 671 (1903).
15 Larsen v. Larsen, 226 P.2d 650 (1951); Dietrich v. Dietrich, 209 S.W.2d
540 (1948); Klekamp v. Klekamp, 275 Ill. 98, 113 N.E. 852 (1916);
35 A.L.R. 1107.
16 Stibbs v. Stibbs, 231 P.2d 310 (1951); McFarlin v. McFarlin, 75 So.2d
580 (1954). Cf. Friederich v. Friederich, 6 N.J.Super. 102, 70 A.2d
177 (1950), where the court allowed the wife attorney's fees even
though she had money in the bank. The money had accumulated by
checks sent to her because her first husband was killed in the service
and the money was placed in the bank for the benefit for her child
and the child of her first husband. These circumstances justified it
not being used by her for attorney's fees in an action against her
second husband.
17 Willits v. Willits, 76 Neb. 225, 107 N.W. 379 (1906); Klekamp v. Kle-
kamp, 275 Ill. 98, 113 N.E. 852 (1916); 143 A.L.R. 799; 56 A.L.R.2d 120.
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of the husband to pay, and the necessity of a litigation in accord-
ance with the policy and practice of the particular jurisdiction,
whether such allowance should be made, and if so the amount.'8
On a hearing to determine the value of the services, the court
may hear expert witnesses but is not bound by their testimony.19
The Nebraska cases reflect this general decisional pattern. The
Nebraska Supreme Court will interfere only to correct a patent
injustice resulting from an allowance which is clearly excessive
or insufficient. 20 The fee may be fixed either with or without
the aid of expert testimony as to value, although neither the
trial nor appellate court can, in assessing such fees, arbitrarily
ignore the undisputed evidence and findings based thereon.2 1
The Nebraska Court has said it is proper to consider the amount
involved, the nature of the litigation, the time and labor required,
the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised and the skill
required properly to conduct the case, the care and diligence
exhibited, the result of the suit, the character and standing of
the attorney, and the customary charges of the bar for similar
services.22
In addition to counsel fee allowances in the trial court, the
wife in most states also may have such allowance on appeal
though a few states deny it where the lower court decree was
in favor of the husband and the wife was unsuccessful on ap-
peal.23 The test in Nebraska, however, is not whether the wife
won or lost in the lower court or on appeal but whether or not
a reasonable justification for the appeal appears. 24
III. TYPES OF ACTIONS
For present purposes matrimonial actions may be classified
under four major headings: existence of the marriage in doubt
and being challenged; existence of the marriage established but
an action instead to dissolve the marriage or separate; actions
Is Morland, Keezer on the Law of Marriage and Divorce § 613 (3rd ed.
1946).
19 Sweat v. Sweat, 123 Ga. 801, 51 S.E. 716 (1905).
20 Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 166 Neb. 164, 88 N.W.2d 221 (1958).
21 Lippincott v. Lippincott, 152 Neb. 374, 41 N.W.2d 232 (1950).
22 Allen v. City of Omaha, 136 Neb. 620, 286 N.W. 916 (1939); Lippincott
v. Lippincott, 152 Neb. 374, 41 N.W.2d 232 (1950).
23 Buehler v. Buehler, 300 IIl.App. 607, 21 N.E.2d 56 (1939); 143 A.L.R.
799, Contra: Wald v. Wald, 124 Iowa 183, 99 N.W. 720 (1904).
24 Smallcomb v. Smallcomb, 165 Neb. 191, 84 N.W.2d 217 (1957).
COMMENTS
modifying previous decrees or affecting the issue of the marriage;
and actions to enjoin conduct affecting the marriage. Since the
actions within each of these categories are generally approached
in the same manner by the courts, they are here considered to-
gether in order to avoid repetition.
A. EXISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE IN DOUBT AND BEING CHALLENGED
Two types of actions fall within this category-annulment
and declaration of nullity. The predominant theme is the simple
one of whether or not a marriage relation exists.25
1. Action for Annulment
Many statutes expressly provide for counsel fees to the wife
in annulment actions, leaving the question of whether such fees
should be awarded in an individual case to the court's discre-
tion.26 Under such a statute the award will be made even if
the wife is the one seeking the dissolution.27 In the absence of
statutes the courts draw a distinction according to whether the
husband or wife seeks the annulment. Where the husband pe-
titions and the wife seeks to uphold the marriage the wife is en-
titled to counsel fees if she makes a prima facie showing of the
validity of the marriage.28 In Zatavern v. Zatavern, for example,
a leading Nebraska case, the wife brought a divorce action and
the husband cross-petitioned for annulment alleging the marriage
was procured by fraud. The trial court granted a decree of an-
nulment to the husband though requiring the husband to pay
his wife's attorney.2 9 Notwithstanding that the annulment de-
cree was affirmed on appeal the trial court's order allowing coun-
sel fees to the wife was approved and an additional sum was
awarded the wife for services of her counsel on appeal.30 The
25 Colbert v. Colbert, 169 P.2d 633 (1946); Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal.2d
497, 261 "P.2d 269 (1953); Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N.Y. 184 (1872);
Abramson v. Abramson, 161 Neb. 782, 74 N.W.2d 919 (1956); 4 A.L.R.
926; 110 A.L.R. 128.
26 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-371 (1956); Wests' Ann. Cal. Code, Civil
Code § 137.5.
27 Ibid.
28 Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal.2d 497, 261 P.2d 269 (1953); Bancroft v.
Bancroft, 9 Cal.App.2d 464, 50 P.2d 465 (1935); 4 A.L.R. 926; 110
A.L.R. 128.
29 Zatavern v. Zatavern, 155 Neb. 395, 52 N.W.2d 254 (1952).
30 Ibid.
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fact that Nebraska has no statute authorizing counsel fee awards
in annulment action was regarded as immaterial.
The result is different, however, where the wife is the plain-
tiff, as she therefore admits no legal obligation upon the part
of her reputed husband.3 1 She may not be allowed the award
because she is repudiating the relation which is the basis of her
right to such award.3 2
2. Declaration of Nullity
Annulment cases, of course, involve voidable marriages, mar-
riages valid until set aside by a judicial decree.3 3 Declaration of
nullity actions, on the other hand, deal with void marriages and
are brought to clarify the marital status.3 4  Only a few statutes
expressly provide for counsel fees in declaration of nullity actions,
and then only under certain circumstances; for example, only
where the suit is brought by the husband and the wife asserts
the validity of the marriage.3 5 As noted above, such conditions
are not found in the statutes authorizing counsel fees in annul-
ment actions.30
Where no statutes are involved, many declaration of nullity
cases turn on the same considerations as do the annulment cases,
viz., according to which spouse brings the suit and whether the
validity of the marriage is in dispute.3 7 Some jurisdictions, how-
ever, apparently refuse to allow counsel fees to an unsuccessful
wife in a nullity case even though she in good faith seeks to up-
hold the marriage. Abramson v. Abramson, though not strictly
31 Heafey v. Heafey, 142 Misc. 147, 254 N.Y.S. 82 (1931); 4 A.L.R. 932.
32 Ibid.
33 Herron v. Herron, 28 Misc. 323, 59 N.Y.Supp. 861 (1899), where a
wife sought to have her marriage annulled for the reason that she
was under the legal age of consent at the time of the marriage the
court would allow her nothing for alimony or counsel fees. If after
she had reached the age of consent she had affirmed her marriage it
would have remained valid.
34 Lapp v. Lapp, 43 Mfich. 287, 5 N.W. 317 (1880), where the husband had
a wife living apart from him under separation when he married the
second wife. The second marriage was void and incapable of being
valid under those circumstances.
3 Oregon Rev. Stat. 107.090; District of Columbia § 16-410 (14:70).
36 District of Columbia § 16-410 (14:70).
37 Friedenwald v. Friedenwald, 57 App.D.C. 13, 16 F.2d 509 (1926), writ
of certiorari denied 273 U.S. 763, 71 L.Ed. 879, 47 S.Ct. 476 (1927).
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a nullity case, may serve to illustrate the point.3 8 The wife
brought suit for divorce alleging a common law marriage in Iowa.
The husband claimed that no such marriage was ever contracted.
Judgment went for the wife in the trial court and she secured a
portion of the property accumulated while the parties were liv-
ing together and attorney's fees. On appeal, however, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court found no common law marriage and ac-
cordingly reversed not only the property settlement award but
the counsel fee order as well:
An allowance for counsel fees and suit money is, like an award
of alimony, dependent upon the existence of the marriage relation;
and if this is denied and the wife fails to refute such denial, her
application must be refused owing to her failure to make out a
prima facie case.3 9
The Michigan case of Lapp v. Lapp is also noteworthy in this
connection.40 The wife brought suit for divorce and it appeared
that she knew at the time of her marriage to the defendant that
he had a wife living apart from him. It was held that the mar-
riage was void and that the wife was not entitled to counsel
fees. 4'
B. EXISTENCE OF MARRIAGE ESTABLISHED; ACTION TO DISsOLvE
MARRIAGE, OR SEPARATE
The actions here of course are those for divorce and separate
maintenance. The parties do not deny the existence of the mar-
riage but want to sever or alter it. Counsel fees and suit money
are as a general rule allowed to the wife in both kinds of actions
and under the same rules and principles. 42
Most states have statutes specifically allowing counsel fees to
the wife in divorce and separation actions and under most of
them the wife is allowed fees whether she is prosecuting or de-
fending.43 In a few states the court is likewise empowered to
award counsel fees to the husband should justice require it but
38 Abramson v. Abramson, 161 Neb. 782, 74 N.W.2d 919 (1956).
39 Ibid.
40 Lapp v. Lapp, 43 Mich. 287, 5 N. W. 317 (1880).
41 Ibid.
42 Morland, op. cit. supra note 1, § 610.
43 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-308 (Reissue 1952); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-371
(1956); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.14 (1957 Supp.); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§
125.040, 125.200 (1957).
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such statutes are exceptional and counsel fee awards to the hus-
band are nowhere allowed in the absence of statute.44
Some of the statutes expressly say "counsel fees" or "attor-
ney's fees."4  Others do not grant the fees expressly, but phrases
such as "any money necessary to enable the wife" and "expenses
of the suit" have been construed to include attorney's fees.46 In
North Carolina and Kentucky the word "costs" has been con-
strued to include reasonable attorney's fees.47 Nebraska's statute
on the subject provides that in every suit brought either for di-
vorce or separation, the court in its discretion may require the
husband to pay any sum necessary to enable the wife to carry on
or defend the suit during its pendency, and such sum is taxed as
costs to the husband.48 The Nebraska Supreme Court has given
a liberal construction to the statute and has sustained counsel fee
awards in many matrimonial actions not specifically mentioned in
the statute.4
9
Since the courts are ordinarily restricted to awarding coun-
sel fees only where a marriage relationship exists, what kind of
proof is necessary in order to establish the marriage for the pur-
pose of an application for counsel fees? The New York case of
Brinkley v. Brinkley illustrates the majority position in holding
that in addition to the allegations of the complaint and denial,
the court may use affidavits and other papers to decide the exis-
tence of the marriage for the purposes of the application.5" If
44 Iowa Code Ann. § 598.11 (1946); Ann. Laws of Mass c. 208 § 38 (1953);
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1955); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.14 (1957
Supp.). O'Neill v. O'Neill, 164 Neb. 674, 83 N.W.2d 92.
45 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-371 (1956); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.14 (1957
Supp.); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.440 (1957); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-1-5
(1953).
46 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-308 (Reissue 1952); Idaho § 32-704 (1948); Okla.
St. Ann. § 1276 (1931); New Mexico Stat. Ann. § 22-7-6 (1953).
47 Gen. Stat. of N. Car. § 6-21 (Recompiled 1953); Kentucky Rev. Stat.
§ 453.120 (1959).
48 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-308 (Reissue 1952), In every suit brought either
for a divorce or for a separation, the court may, in its discretion, re-
quire the husband to pay any sum necessary to enable the wife to
carry on or defend the suit during its pendency; and it may decree
costs against either party, and award execution for the same; or it
may direct such costs to be paid out of any property sequestered,
or in the power of the court, or in the hands of a receiver.
49 Chambers v. Chambers, 75 Neb. 850, 106 N.W. 993 (1906).
50 Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N.Y. 184 (1872); Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal.
2d 497, 261 P.2d 269 (1953); 4 A.L.R. 934.
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then the court is tentatively satisfied of the fact of marriage, it
has the power to grant counsel fees. Although such order im-
plies a finding of the existence of the marriage, the proceeding
need not be so complete nor the evidence so extensive as upon
the trial of the issues and the order does not determine those
issues nor affect the final judgment.". The prima facie existence
of the marriage is the controlling factor and if the wife makes
out a reasonably plain case showing the marriage she should
be furnished with means of conducting the suit until the truth
or falsehood of her allegations can be ascertained by the proofs
formally taken in the case.52  Abramson v. Abramson, discussed
above, is apparently contrary to the above rule because in the
lower court the wife was successful and evidently had established
to the court's satisfaction the existence of the marriage. Despite
this however the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the award
of counsel fees on finding that rio common law marriage existed. '3
Several other problems likewise deserve mention. The first
is whether it makes any difference if the wife is prosecuting or
defending. Most of the statutes provide for counsel fees in either
case and Nebraska follows this pattern in a statute which pro-
vides "to carry on or defend". 54 Even without the statutes, how-
ever, most courts allow attorneys fees to the wife whether she
prosecutes or defends.55
The second question is whether the wife will be granted coun-
sel fees if she has sufficient independent means to conduct the
suit. At times the wife has been entitled to counsel fees despite
her possession of independent means. 6 However, generally the
courts, in their discretion, will examine the financial situation
of the parties and if the wife has sufficient means of her own to
conduct the case will refuse the award. 7 One court held that
the wife need not pauperize herself by selling her assets to make
the cash outlay necessary for litigation and that she could not
51 Ibid.
52 Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal.2d 497, 261 P.2d 269 (1953).
53 Supra note 38.
54 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-308 (Reissue 1952); District of Columbia § 16-410
(14:70); Idaho Code § 32-704 (1948).
55 4 A.L.R. 926.
56 Dietrich v. Dietrich, Mo. 209 S.W.2d 540 (1948); Friederich v. Fried-
erich, 6 N.J.Super. 102, 70 A.2d 177 (1950).
57 Stibbs v. Stibbs, 231 P.2d 310 (1951); Tilley v. Tilley, 210 Ark. 850,
198 S.W.2d 168 (1946); McFarlin v. McFarlin, 75 So.2d 580 (1954).
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be put to the election of spending her money for living expenses
or the preparation of her case but that she is not entitled to the
award when she has ample funds for both.58 In Stibbs v. Stibbs
the court held:
The purpose of the statute is not to excuse the wife from
spending her own money, but to provide for the efficient pre-
sentation of her case when she is unable to do so from her own
resources without hardship.59
A third question is whether the wife's misconduct will bar
her award. The discretion over the allowance that most courts
in the United States possess has been exercised to deny an al-
lowance where the wife has been guilty of matrimonial miscon-
duct.s0 Consequently, where the wife is charged with miscon-
duct her application in many states must either deny it or show
a valid defense. 01 The courts have denied counsel fees to the
wife for acts such as her voluntary abandonment of her husband
and adultery.0 2 One case even talks of the court's "duty" to deny
attorney's fees if the testimony establishes without dispute that
the wife abandoned her husband without just cause. 68 In other
cases the courts weigh the relative guilt of the husband and wife
in determining whether the wife should be allowed fees.64
Does it make any difference if the wife is successful or un-
successful in prosecuting or defending? Though few cases have
been found discussing this question explicitly, all cases examined
seem to assume that it make no difference providing that the
wife is not guilty of severe matrimonial misconduct and there
was some probability of success. And one recent case expressly
so states.65
G Stibbs v. Stibbs, 231 P.2d 310 (1951).
59 Ibid.
00 Reece v. Reece, 232 N.C. 95, 59 S.E.2d 363 (1950); Acree v. Acree,
40 S.E.2d (1946); Tilley v. Tilley, 210 Ark. 856, 198 S.W.2d 168 (1946),
deals with voluntary abandonment by the wife. For cases which
discuss adultery see Abbe v. Abbe, 68 So.2d 565 (1953); Williams
v. Williams, 230 N.C. 660, 55 S.E.2d 195 (1949); Simmons v. Simmons,
135 S.E. 350 (1926).
01 Williams v. Williams, 230 N.C. 660, 55 S.E.2d 195 (1949).
02 Supra note 60.
63 Acree v. Acree, 40 S.E.2d 54 (1946).
64 Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 329, 59 So.2d 409 (1952).
05 Tanner v. Tanner, 229 La. 399, 86 So.2d 80 (1956), held: According
to those principles it makes no difference whether the wife, in bring-
ing the suit and obligating the community assets for her attorney's
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1. Action for Divorce
The Nebraska rule is well stated in Brasch v. Brasch: it is
within the power of the court to order the husband to pay a
certain sum of money to his wife during the pendency of a di-
vorce suit for her expenses in prosecuting or defending the ac-
tion.6 6 Brasch further holds that the amount allowed is a matter
within the trial court's discretion. 67 An interesting Nebraska
case on a method used by the court to force a husband to pay
cousel fees to his wife is Reed v. Reed.68 Plaintiff had refused
to comply with the court's order to pay his wife's attorneys fees
to defend his divorce action. The court would not allow the
husband to proceed with his action until he complied with the
order. The Supreme Court of Nebraska rejected the husband's
contention that such action was unconstitutional and held that
it was entirely within the discretion of the district court to re-
quire the husband to pay the money allowed the wife to enable
her to make a proper defense as a condition precedent to the
right to further prosecute his action.69
The award is for the wife exclusively, a principle perhaps
best illustrated by the recent case of Sechser v. Sechser in which
a district court order requiring the wife who was the successful
litigant in a divorce suit to pay $750 to her husband's attorney
was summarily reversed. 70
2. Action for Separate Maintenance or Bed and Board
These actions require an additional introductory word. Some
statutes provide for counsel fees in actions for "separate main-
tenance" or "bed and board",71 where as others do not specify
fees, is successful or unsuccessful in prosecuting her demand. Sim-
ilarly, it should be immaterial (and we hold that it is) whether she
is successful or unsuccessful in defending the husband's action, par-
ticularly where a dissolution and settlement of the community is
involved. See also: Isserman v. Isserman, 11 N.J. 106, 93 A.2d
571 (1952); Brown v. Brown, 24 N.J.Super. 198, 93 A.2d 616 (1952);
Sharp v. Sharp, 230 Ala. 539, 161 So. 709 (1935).
66 Brasch v. Brasch, 50 Neb. 73, 69 N.W. 392 (1896).
67 Ibid.
68 Reed v. Reed, 70 Neb. 779, 98 N.W. 73 (1904).
69 Ibid.
70 Sechser v. Sechser, 162 Neb. 486, 76 N.W.2d 412 (1956).
71 Wests' Ann. Calif. Code, Civil Code § 137.5; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.14
(1958 Supp.); Oregon Rev. Stat. § 23.020.
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directly the type of actions but refer to them as "similar pro-
ceedings". 72  Even without a statute, however, the award will
be granted where the marriage status is shown.
7 3
Nebraska's statutes provide for "separation" specifically.74 In
Goings v. Goings, the Nebraska Court held the wife who was
allowed a divorce from bed and board should be allowed attor-
ney's fees and the husband should pay such fees into court for
the use of her attorneys. 75 In one of the most recent cases, for
example, Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, the wife brought an action
against her husband for divorce from bed and board and sought
an attorneys fee allowance. 76  The wife prevailed and all costs
were taxed to the husband including the wife's counsel fees.
77
C. ACTIONS MODIFYING PREVIOUS DECREES OR AFFECTING
THE ISSUE OF MARRIAGE
Discussed here are actions to modify a divorce or separation
decree, custody, and child support actions. The modification
might be an increase or decrease in alimony payments or an
attempt by the wife to modify the original support amount or
to change custody.
There is first of all the question of whether the wife who
seeks to have her alimony increased is entitled to fees. While
the cases examined uniformly denied them, all were cases where
the wife was unsuccessful.7 8 Presumably, however, a success-
ful wife is entitled to counsel fees.
72 Fla. Stat. § 65:17 (1957).
73 Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal.2d 497, 261 P.2d 269 (1953).
74 Supra note 48.
75 Goings v. Goings, 90 Neb. 148, 133 N.W. 199 (1911).
70 Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 166 Neb. 164, 88 N.W.2d 221 (1958).
77 Ibid Compare: McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336
(1953), an action brought by the wife in equity against her husband
for suitable maintenance and support money, and for costs and at-
torney's fees. The trial court rendered a decree in her favor, how-
ever the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case holding
that in an action such as this one the parties must be separated
or living apart from each other and since they were still living to-
gether there was no legal basis for the plaintiff's action, and an al-
lowance of attorney's fees was erroneous and not authorized.
78 Baumgarten v. Baumgarten, N.J., 151 Atl. 606 (1930); Densten v.
Densten, 280 Mass. 48, 181 N.E. 714 (1932). There are statutes which
specifically provide for counsel fees for such modifications, Tenn.
Code. Ann., Domestic Relations § 36-820.
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The cases are conflicting on the question of counsel fees in-
curred by the wife in modifications of custody and child support
decrees when no statutes are involved. 79 Some jurisdictions re-
fuse to make any award on the theory that the parties are strang-
ers, and if children are involved they ignore the father's duty
to the child.80 Other courts hold they have inherent power apart
from any statute to hold the father liable for all reasonable ex-
penses, stressing that the parental duty of the father to his chil-
dren continues although the marital relation is at an end and
the welfare of the child is in litigation.8 ' Still other courts award
counsel fees without discussion of the question of power or on
the ground that the award is entirely within the discretion of
the court.8 2
The results are also conflicting where statutes are involved,
though where counsel fees are allowed nothing is made to de-
pend on whether the wife is successful or unsuccessful in obtain-
ing a modification or defending, etc.8 3 While most courts will
allow counsel fees on the theory that "pendency" in a divorce
action includes any modification of that action8 4 a few courts
hold to the contrary.8 5 Where the statute provides for counsel
fees to the wife "during pending action" or in order "to prose-
cute or defend" most courts have held these provisions to be
broad enough to include cases where one party has petitioned
for modification after the decree became final on the theory that
it is merely a continuation of the original action.8 0 Some statutes,
however, clearly deny attorneys fees to the wife after the final
79 Robinson v. Robinson, 112 Miss. 224, 72 So. 923 (1916). Compare
Carter v. Carter, 156 Md. 500, 144 Atl. 490 (1928); 15 A.L.R.2d 1270;
Also see Walters v. Walters, 180 M. 268, 177 So. 507 (1937).
80 Robinson v. Robinson, 112 Miss. 224, 72 So. 923 (1916); 15 A.L.R.2d
1270.
81 Carter v. Carter, 156 Md. 500, 144 Atl. 490 (1928); 15 A.L.R.2d 1270.
82 Walters v. Walters, 180 VL 268, 177 So. 507 (1937); 15 A.L.R.2d 1270.
83 Ind. Stat. Ann. § 3-1220 (1946).
84 Chambers v. Chambers, 75 Neb. 850, 106 N.W. 993 (1906).
85 Wilson v. Wilson, 128 Mt. 511, 278 P.2d 219, overruling McDonald
v. McDonald, 124 Mt. 26, 218 P.2d 929. The Wilson case held that
§ 21-137 of the Rev. Code of Montana does not authorize attorney's
fees in an action to modify the custody provisions of a decree after
the divorce decree becomes final.
86 Mississippi Code Ann. § 2743 (1952), Walters v. Walters, 180 M. 268,
177 So. 507 (1937); Idaho Code § 32-704 (1948), Gifford v. Gifford,
50 Idaho 517, 297 Pac. 1100 (1931).
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determination of the divorce decree and thus no allowance can
be made for modification or setting aside a decree
8
"
1. Alimony Modifications
In O'Brien v. O'Brien, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld
an order requiring the husband to pay into court a reasonable
sum to enable the wife to prosecute the action where she sought
modification of the divorce decree alleged to have been obtained
by fraud of the husband."" Bowman v. Bowman is also of in-
terest.8 9 This was a proceeding brought by a divorced husband
for modification of a divorce decree. The trial court rendered
judgment modifying the decree thus relieving the husband from
any alimony obligation and the wife appealed. The judgment
was reversed as no valid ground for modification was shown
and the wife was given an allowance for counsel fees.90 It is
interesting to note that even in cases where the court affirmed
a reduction of alimony and support, the wife has still been given
an allowance for her attorneys.9 1
2. Custody
Some states leave no doubt as to the allowance in custody
actions because the legislature has specifically provided for them.9 2
But even where no specific mention is made in the statute, as in
Nebraska, the courts often construe the statute to allow the
awards on the theory that the custody action is a mere continua-
tion of a former divorce or separation action 8 The leading Ne-
braska case is Chambers v. Chambers in which the former wife
petitioned for custody of her minor child, for alimony, and for
attorney's fees.9 4 In the previous divorce action the question of
custody was not decided. The trial court found for the wife in
the custody suit and allowed counsel fees. The father appealed
alleging error because the mother had ceased to be his wife. The
87 Rev. Codes of Montana § 21-137 (1947).
88 O'Brien v. O'Brien, 19 Neb. 584, 27 N.W. 640 (1886).
s9 Bowman v. Bowman, 163 Neb. 336, 79 N.W.2d 554 (1956).
90 Ibid.
91 Schrader v. Schrader, 148 Neb. 162, 26 N.W.2d 617 (1947).
92 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-1-5 (1953); Rev. Stat. of Maine c. 166 § 59 (1954).
93 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-308 (Reissue 1952), Chambers v. Chambers, 75
Neb. 850, 106 N.W. 993 (1906).
04 Chambers v. Chambers, 75 Neb. 850, 106 N.W. 993 (1906).
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judgment was affirmed however on the theory that the Nebraska
statute authorizing an award of fees "during the pendency" of a
divorce suit authorizes counsel fees until all aspects of the divorce
are finally settled and determined 5
3. Child Support
The child support cases are similar to the custody cases and
indeed both support and custody questions are typically involved
in the same litigation. Nebraska law concerning counsel fees to
the wife appears to be identical in the two cases9 6 In Bize v.
Bize, for example, the wife successfully petitioned for increased
child support and was also allowed counsel fees. The Supreme
Court upheld the district court judgment and allowed additional
counsel fees on appeal.9 7 If the wife were unsuccessful in this
action the determining factor would probably be the prima facie
merit of her claim. 98
4. Attorney's fees in bastardy proceedings
The cases in this area afford an interesting contrast to those
previously discussed and which assume a broad equitable power
over the award. The common law affords no remedy to compel
a putative faither to contribute to the support of his illegitimate
offspring. 99  Therefore such proceedings must comply strictly
with the statute governing them.10 0 Statutory provisions stipu-
lating merely that the putative father shall be liable for costs of
the bastardy proceeding have been construed as not authorizing
the charging of complainant's attorneys fees to the father since
they are not regarded as part of the costs.1' 1 By California stat-
ute, the allowance may be made provided that a preliminary hear-
ing is held finding the defendant's paternity. Without such find-
ing the trial court is without jurisdiction to award the plaintiff's
95 Ibid.
96 Bize v. Bize, 154 Neb. 520, 48 N.W.2d 649 (1951); Chambers v. Cham-
bers, 75 Neb. 850, 106 N.W. 993 (1906). Ruehle v. Ruehle, 161 Neb.
691, 74 N.W.2d 689 (1956).
97 Bize v. Bize, 154 Neb. 520, 48 N.W.2d 649 (1951).
98 Supra note 24.
99 State ex rel. Beebe v. Cowley, Ohio, 156 N.E. 214 (1927); Cederquist
v. Archuleta et al. Colo., 253 P.2cd 431 (1953). 40 A.L.R.2d 961.
100 40 A.L.R. 961.
101 Ibid.
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counsel any fees.10 2  New York also has a statute specifically
providing for counsel fees in such actions. 0 3 Nebraska has no
statute specifically allowing counsel fees in bastardy actions and
whether they are allowable has not yet been judicially determined.
D. ACTIONS FOR ENFORCENMNT
1. Enforcement
Where the wife sues for unpaid alimony most states, includ-
ing Nebraska, allow her a reasonable counsel fee.10 4 In Miller v.
Miller, for example, the court allowed the wife fees for her coun-
sel's services in collecting past due alimony without court ac-
tion. 10 5 The court held:
If a defendant in a divorce case fails to satisfy a judgment
for alimony rendered therein in favor of the plaintiff according
to its terms, and the plaintiff employs counsel to enforce it and
this is accomplished with or without court proceedings, the court
in which the judgment was rendered has discretionary power by
virtue of sections 42-307 R.R.S. 1943, to require the defendant
to pay to the plaintiff a reasonable sum as compensation for the
services of her counsel in obtaining satisfaction of the judgment. 0 6
The Court held that the divorce decree did not terminate the
trial court's authority to allow attorney's fees. A divorce action
is pending continuously and indefinitely until all matters in-
volved therein or incidental thereto are satisfied and terminated
by section 42-324.107
2. Contempt proceedings
The contempt cases are merely a separate branch of the en-
forcement cases and are decided on the same basis. Bowman v.
102 Carbone v. Superior Ct., 18 Cal.2d 768, 117 P.2d 872 (1941); Hall v.
Hall, 95 Cal.App.2d 541, 213 P.2d 58 (1950).
103 McKinney's Consolidated Laws of the New York Ann. § 120 Col 14,
Domestic Relations Law. "The parents of a child born out of wed-
lock are liable for the necessary support and education of the child.
They are also liable for the child's funeral expenses. The father is
liable to pay the expenses of the mother's confinement and recovery,
and is also liable to pay such expenses, including counsel fees, in
connection with her pregnancy as the court in its discretion may
deem proper..."
104 Tenn. Code Ann., Domestic Relations § 36-822 as amended in 1957 by
Public Acts of Tenn.; Ark. Stat. § 34-1210 (1948).
10 Miller v. Miller, 160 Neb. 766, 71 N.W.2d 478 (1955).
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
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Bowman involved a problem of enforcement in addition to the
attempted modification of a decree.'0 8 The allowance was made
for work done by the wife's attorney in filing a praecipe for ex-
ecution, enforcement of collection of delinquent alimony pay-
ments, filing a praecipe for execution to collect delinquent install-
ments, and showing that the husband was in contempt of court
because of his default. In the case of Lippincott v. Lippincott,
the former wife was called upon to defend a contempt proceeding
brought against her in regard to real estate awarded her as ali-
mony. 0 9 The marital dispute involved many other actions, but
the contempt proceeding is the one of particular concern here.
The court awarded attorney's fees to the wife for all actions she
was forced to defend and prosecute. The attorney's fees were
held to be taxable as costs upon application and therefore not to
require the opening or modification of the judgment for divorce
or alimony." 0
E. ACTION TO ENJonv
The issuance of an injunction by one state court to affect a
marital proceeding in another state has been used only in recent
years and then under strict conditions."' It is not surprising
then that few cases discuss the question of counsel fees. Most of
the cases found however allowed the fees without discussion." 2
In the cases where they were not mentioned, the petitioning
spouse may not have made application for them.
The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals in 1942, af-
firmed the lower court's interlocutory order providing for coun-
sel fees and restraining the defendant from proceeding with his
action for a divorce against the petitioner in Pennsylvania. 1 3
Two years later, the case of Peff v. Peff the New Jersey court
again allowed counsel fees of $1,000 to the wife in an injunction
to restrain her husband from instituting suit in another state for
dissolution of the marriage because of the wife's insanity." 4
108 Bowman v. Bowman, 163 Neb. 336, 79 N.W.2d 554 (1956).
109 Lippincott v. Lippincott, 152 Neb. 374, 41 N.W.2d 232 (1950).
110 Ibid.
"11 54 A.L.R.2d 1244.
112 Pef v. Peff, 134 N.J.Eq. 506, 36 A.2d 203 (1944); Glacken v. Glacken,
132 N.J.Eq. 304, 28 A.2d 213 (1942).
"3 Glacken v. Glacken, 132 N.J.Eq. 304, 28 A.2d 213 (1942).
"4 Peff v. Peff, 134 N.J.Eq. 506, 36 A.2d 203 (1944).
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The Supreme Court of New York also allowed counsel fees
in an injunction proceeding in the case of Maloney v. Maloney
where the wife brought suit against her husband for separate
maintenance.115 The wife successfully prayed for an injunction
restraining her husband from procuring a Nevada divorce and
was also awarded counsel fees and disbursements of $400. This
Court dealt with the problem specifically:
Husbands who seek to flout the laws of our State and their
marital status here existing, resorting to foreign jurisdictions in
pursuit of such intention, should expect to pay adequately, by
way of counsel fees, in the litigation in this State which follows
and is made necessary by such action.116
Research failed to reveal any Nebraska cases dealing with
counsel fees in injunctions against out-of-state divorces. Since
Nebraska has been so liberal to the wife in the other areas, how-
ever, it is probable that the Court would allow counsel fees in
these cases also.1
17
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CRITICISM LEVIED
AGAINST COUNSEL FEES
The Royal Commission Report on Marriage and Divorce was
a study of the legal-marital problems of England and Scotland
and recommendations were made in reference to counsel fees.11 s
Before analyzing the criticisms made, it would be well to examine
the English and Scottish method of handling counsel fee problems
to see if there are any substantial differences between these
countries and the United States which might make the recom-
mendations inapplicable to the United States.
In England, the wife has been, and to a lessening degree
still is, a privileged suitor against her husband. Whether peti-
tioning or defending, she may apply for security for her costs of
the suit and in appropriate circumstances the court will order
the husband to pay a sum of money into court, or give security,
in respect of part or the whole of her estimated costs. If she is
unsuccessful at the trial she will seldom be ordered to pay her
husband's costs and she will often be awarded her own costs up
115 Maloney v. Maloney, 51 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1944).
116 Ibid.
117 Supra note 49.
118 Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, Report 1951-1955, cmd.
9678 (1956).
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to, or sometimes beyond, the sum paid to the court as security.""
In 1950 a new factor was introduced, Legal Aid, whereby a wife
with little or no independent means was assured of obtaining a
lawyer in matrimonial actions.1 20 Her attorney is reimbursed for
eighty-five per cent of his costs out of the legal aid fund, whether
the wife is successful or note. However, the Act expressly re-
tains the rights and liabilities of the parties. This entitles the
legal aid fund to the protection previously given the wife by an
order against the husband for security for the wife's costs.'-"
In Scotland, as in England, a wife is a privileged suitor against
her husband in matrimonial actions to the extent that if she has
no separate means her husband is usually required to pay her
expenses, whatever the result of the action, and will not be given
his expenses against her if she is unsuccessful. 122
The original reasons for favoring the wife in marital actions
were the same in all three countries. The Commission's Report
takes the position that the reason for the rule has ceased to exist
because wives presently have the means to obtain adequate coun-
sel. In the first place, wives have for a long time been free from
any disability with regard to ownership of property and may well
have means sufficient to pay counsel fees.123  The Commission
does concede, however, that there are many married women who
are financially dependent on their husbands, either wholly or
partly. But the Commission deals with this by saying that Legal
Aid now insures the wife professional counsel.' 24 Here is one of
the major differences between the United States and these coun-
tries because the United States has no such plan for the wife as
such. Of course, it has Legal Aid Bureaus where the wife could
obtain legal assistance if she has need, but even so it is not the
same as being able to choose her own attorney or being able to
meet the costs of the action. In this respect there could still be
a great deal of inequality.
The Report recommends that the court should continue to
have wide discretion in determining the liability for costs in
matrimonial proceedings. In the exercise of this discretion the
Commission contemplated that as a general rule the husband
1"9 -Ibid, § 438.
120 Supra note 118, § 444.
12 Ibid.
122 Supra note 118, § 448.
123 Supra note 118, § 456.
l24 Ibid.
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would not be made liable for the costs of an unsuccessful wife
nor would it be necessary for him to prove that she has sufficient
means before he can obtain an order for his costs against her. 25
In other words, the husband and wife would be treated on exactly
the same footing.120
The argument that women generally are in a better position
is as true in America as it is in England or Scotland. We also
have Married Women's Property Acts which give the wife the
right to her own separate property and place her in a better posi-
tion to provide for her counsel in marital actions. However, the
recommendations would be inequitable if applied in the United
States because unlike England's welfare system which provides
a Legal Aid system, the United States would have no adequate
substitute to offer the wife who is unable to raise the money for
an attorney. The English plan assures the wife's counsel at least
eighty-five per cent of his fee. While it may be true that many
women today have funds, it is also true, as conceded by the Royal
Commission's Report, that there are still many women who are
dependent on their husbands wholly or partly.
The most equitable answer lies in the present system. It is
not without its weaknesses, however, and some states have sought
to cure them by statutes. 27 As an example, the wife should be
denied counsel fees if she has adequate means of her own to con-
duct the case. The allowance was created for the purpose of
equalizing the parties, not to penalize the husband.
The general pattern of the cases examined illustrated first,
that the court determines if prima facie a marriage exists. This
was the main concern of the annulment and nullity actions. If
the marriage was not shown, generally the award would be de-
nied. But even this rule has been tempered at times when the
court felt the good faith of the parties warranted an allowance.
If the wife seeks to declare the marriage invalid she will be de-
nied the award because she is seeking to repudiate the relation
which is the very basis of the right. When the marriage is es-
tablished as in the cases of divorce and separation, the court is
usually willing to grant the award unless the wife has been guilty
of marital misconduct. Perhaps the courts should place greater
stress on this last condition because the husband should not be
125 Supra note 118, § 460.
126 Supra note 118, § 458.
127 Ann. Code of Maryland Art. 16 § 5 (1957); Waters v. Waters 191
Md. 436, 62 A.2d 250 (1948).
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forced to pay the wife's counsel when her own conduct has made
the suit necessary. When the suit concerns only the husband
and wife the courts should take a critical attitude toward the
position of both parties, but a more liberal view should be taken
in allowing fees in cases involving children. The courts take di-
vergent views in this area. One theory maintains the ex-wife
should not be given the fees because her former husband is then
a stranger. However, the better view followed in Nebraska and
many other states stresses the welfare of the child and holds
that the parental duty of the father to his children continues
despite any change in the marital relationship. One area where
the courts are very reluctant to award counsel fees is in bastardy
proceedings. Certainly counsel fees should be allowed to the
mother when she successfully shows the defendant's paternity.
Throughout one theme has been dominant: "discretion of
the court".128 It would seem that what most of the courts have
attempted is to make the husband give the wife her part of the
marriage funds so that she could protect her own interests in
either prosecuting or defending marital actions. In the case of
Chestnut v. Chestnut, the judge was writing about alimony but
his remarks would also apply to counsel fees.1 29 He summed up
the theory very well:
It is awarded on the theory that marriage is a partnership
to which the wife has contributed and when she withdraws from
it she is entitled to reimbursement that she may not become a
public charge.130
This theory that each partner should be allowed a portion of
the marriage assets to protect his interests is in agreement with
statutes like the one in Washington which allow attorney's fees
and costs to either party upon a showing of need. 13 1 The under-
lying theory is that a party should not be deprived of his or her
day in court by reason of poverty. 32
The advantage of our system is that the decision to award
or to deny counsel fees is left with the court which hears the
case and can determine from all the circumstances whether an
allowance should be made.
Arlyss Welch Spence '59
12S Supra note 3.
129 Chesnut v. Chesnut, 33 So.2d 730 (1948).
130 Id., at p. 731.
131 Rev. Code of Washington § 26.08.190 (Rem. Supp. 1949 § 997-19);
Gibson v. Von Olnhausen, 263 P.2d 954 (1953).
132 Gibson v. Von Olnhausen, 263 P.2d 954 (1953).
